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ABSTRACT

The Declaratory Judgment Act permits a federal district court to grant
declaratory relief where an actual controversy exists. Whether an actual
controversy exists for declaratory judgments of patent non-infringement
is governed by the Federal Circuit's test of the "totality of the
circumstances." The declaratory judgment plaintiff has the burden of
proving an actual controversy exists. However, the declaratory
judgment defendant has the burden of proving patent infringement
exists. Reasonable apprehension for a suit may be found to exist
although the patentee made no patent-based threat. A company fearing
business disruption from patent litigation can thus use declaratory
judgment actions offensively. Declaratory judgment suits need to be
used cautiously and skillfully, with a clear focus on business objectives.
Under certain circumstances, a declaratory judgment action of noninfringement is the most prudent and effective way for a company to
resolve patent conflicts.
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DJ JIVE
It feels so fine,
that DJ of mine;
When I fear a patentee,
though silent he may be,
I DJ every time.
To your customers I advance;
You, patentee, ain't got a chance;
Your careful statements, I don't sweat,
cause nearly all's as good as threat,
under "totalityof circumstance."
On your patents I'll DJ,
when e'er I fear you in my way;
I'm so very new,
I need good headlines, 'bout me and you,
or in business I won't stay.
Advisory opinion you might say,
but totality gets in your way,
Before totality,
you might have stopped DJs by me;
but now, it's on my terms you'll play.
Cheap for me, but not for you:
infringement's your burden, once I sue;
Though you've never threatened me,
I'm threatened, under totality;
quick trial and injunction-I want the two.
Threats tied to your patents, I don't need:
nexus is not the sounding reed;
I'm new-so let's make a deal,
'cause threatened by you, I do feel;
patent clearance is my meed.
No, I will not go away,
'till "You're free to sell" you say;
A license free, you'll give to me,
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or costly, I'll make it be,
and then you'll want to play.
Let's make a deal, and let's be done;
your business is too big, just for one;
I want in-I want in now;
I want to milk your money cow;
and if I lose, 'twill have cost me none.
In view of this, I do advance,
Under "totalityofcireumstance."

I. INTRODUCTION
DJ Jive-a foolish and fanciful ditty, or an insightful and realistic verse? Has the
totality of the circumstances test of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
changed legal reasoning? For a declaratory judgment of non-infringement of a United
States patent, must a nexus or causal connection exist between the patentee's conduct
and the patent sued upon? Or is a generally hostile business environment sufficient for
apprehension of a suit? Does the answer change when the declaratory judgment
plaintiff is a small start-up and the declaratory judgment defendant is the established
market leader? Does the Declaratory Judgment Act apply differently to patents than to
other subject matter?
Frequently used as a defensive measure in a counterclaim, declaratory judgment
actions can effectively be used offensively by a company fearing business disruption from
patent litigation, to force the patent owner to grant patent clearance or prove
infringement now-at a time important to the product's life cycle and when the patent
owner might not be prepared to prove infringement.

II. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS
The Declaratory Judgment Act is not an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.1
Under 28 U.S.C. § 22012 a federal district court is permitted to grant declaratory relief
in a case of actual controversy within the court's jurisdiction. "Whether an actual
controversy exists upon particular facts is a question of law, and is subject to plenary
appellate review."3 "Whether an actual controversy exists depends on ...the totality of
I B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 124 F.3d 1419, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ('[T]he
Declaratory Judgment Act neither expands a court's jurisdiction nor creates new substantive rights.
Instead the Act is a procedural device that provides a non coercive remedy.., in cases involving an
actual controversy that has not reached the stage at which either party may seek a coercive remedy,
or in which a party who could sue for coercive relief has not yet done so.").
2 28 U.S.C. § 2201 provides, in pertinent part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or
not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force
and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
3 BP Chem. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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the circumstances," 4 and is decided by applying Federal Circuit law, not regional circuit
law, because "[t]he reasonable apprehension of a threat of patent infringement 'clearly
5
implicates' the patent law."
The requirement for "a case of actual controversy" under Section 2201, is the same
6
as the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution.
"The existence of an actual controversy is an absolute predicate for declaratory judgment
7
jurisdiction.... [Without it] the court has no discretion to decide the case."
The requirement for "a case ...within its jurisdiction" under Section 2201, would
be satisfied under Sections 13318 and 13389 of TITLE 28, United States Code, if an actual
controversy exists, because the coercive claim raised by the complaint for a declaratory
judgment of non-infringement is one of patent infringement. This would be the
underlying claim that would be asserted by the prospective plaintiff (the declaratory
judgment defendant) in an action to enforce the right or obligation allegedly in dispute. 10
The fact that the purported coercive claim arises under federal law, however, is not
sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction when an actual controversy does not exist.
The fact that a patent exists does not alone create a right to challenge its validity in
court, or to obtain a decree of non-infringement. Absent an actual controversy, a
challenge of patent invalidity or non-infringement is an abuse of judicial process-a rule
that protects quiescent patent owners against unwarranted litigation."
The declaratory judgment plaintiffhas the burden of proving an actual controversy
exists. 12 However, it is the declaratory judgment defendant who has the burden of
proving patent infringement exists. That is, the burden of proving patent infringement
13
is on the patentee, regardless of who brings the lawsuit.
A declaratory judgment action may be adjudicated speedily and expeditiously if the
court decides early resolution is necessary to avoid accrual of actual damages or harm to
a litigant, or to otherwise further the remedial objectives of the Declaratory Judgment
Act. 14 A declaratory judgment may be given an early, advanced hearing in preference to
15
other matters on the court's calendar.
Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Id. at 888 n.4; Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1469 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
6 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-41 (1937); see also Middle S. Energy, Inc.
v. City of New Orleans, 800 F.2d 488, 490 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Sys., Inc.,
742 F.2d 1388, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
7 Spectronics Corp. v. Harry B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631, 633-34 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights
and trademarks.").
10 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950).
11Int'l Med. Prosthetics Research Assocs., Inc. v. Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc., 787 F.2d 572, 576
(Fed. Cir. 1986); Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir.

1988).
Jervis, 742 F.2d at 1398-99.
Sea Indus., Inc. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The burden
always is on the patentee to show infringement."). The ramifications of this burden being on the
declaratory judgment defendant, rather than on the declaratory judgment plaintiff, are explored
infra in Section IV.
'1 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ETAL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
57.22[3] (3d ed. 1999).
12

"3 Under

IFFED. R. Civ. P. 57.
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Declaratory judgment jurisdiction exists, according to the Federal Circuit, when an
examination of the totality of the circumstances indicates that an actual controversy
exists between the parties. The existence of a case or controversy must be evaluated on
a patent claim by patent claim basis.

16

The test for declaratory judgment jurisdiction in a patent case has two prongs. The
first prong examines the conduct of the patent owner: Has the patent owner's conduct
created a reasonable apprehension that the declaratory judgment plaintiff will face an
infringement suit if the declaratory judgment plaintiff commences or continues the
"activity in question"? The second prong looks to the conduct of the declaratory
judgment plaintiff
Has the declaratory judgment plaintiff actually produced, or
prepared to produce, the "accused" product? 17 The test is an objective test; a purely
subjective apprehension of an infringement suit is not sufficient to satisfy the actual
18
controversy requirement.
Some might surmise, quite logically, that this two-prong objective test presupposes
the existence of an "activity" by the declaratory judgment plaintiff which was
"questioned" by the patent-holding declaratory judgment defendant: A product of the
plaintiff was accused of infringement,19 and this accusation was made by the
defendant.20 Such predicates, however, need not exist; an actual controversy may be
found in their absence, under the Federal Circuit's totality of the circumstances
21
approach.
This Federal Circuit approach gives a tremendous advantage to the plaintiff in a
patent-based declaratory judgment action to the detriment of the patent-owning
defendant, as we see in the following hypothetical fact situation.

16Jervis, 742 F.2d at 1399.
17 Id. at 1398-99; Indium Corp. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 883 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
18Jervis, 742 F.2d at 1398-99; Indium, 781 F.2d at 882-83; Arrowhead,846 F.2d at 736.
19Infringement may be direct or indirect, but in either event, the product made by the
declaratory judgment plaintiff was accused of infringement.
20 Either directly or indirectly, but in either event, the accusation originated from the
declaratory judgment defendant.
21 Shell Oil, 970 F.2d at 889 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Whether an actual controversy exists depends
on either an express charge of infringement or,i/none, the totality of the circumstances.") (emphasis
added). There is a long line of Federal Circuit cases, all of which rely on the Federal Circuit's
interpretation and application of the Supreme Court's rather short opinion in the insurance contract
case [Md. Casualty Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co.] 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). See: Cygnus Therapeutic
Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (Fed. Cir. 1996); EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d
807, 810 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed.
Cir. 1995); BP Chems., 4 F.3d at 977-78; Spectronics, 940 F.2d at 634; Arrowhead,846 F.2d at 735;
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 955-56 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Gore
Enter. Holdings, 787 F.2d at 575; Indium, 781 F.2d at 882; see also C.R. Bard v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d
874, 880 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (concluding that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) must be determined
by "an examination of the totality of the circumstances ...to determine whether there is a
controversy arising under the patent laws.").
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III.

HYPOTHETICAL FACTUAL SETTING

A. Leader,Newcomer, and the Marketplace
LEADER is the market leader in designing, making, and selling "SUB-WIDGETS", a
component part used in relatively common "WIDGET-MACHINES". 22 WIDGET-MACHINES
are made and distributed by various entities. SUB-WIDGETS are also designed, made,
and sold by various entities. WIDGET-MACHINES are generally designed around a
particular SUB-WIDGET, and take advantage of the particular properties of the SuBWIDGET chosen for the WIDGET-MACHINE design. WIDGET-MACHINES are generally
directed toward one of three markets: 1) a high-end, high-profit, cutting-edge business
and industrial market; 2) a more general lower-profit market; and 3) a low-profit, highvolume, home-user market. SUB-WIDGETS are designed, made, and sold by a small
number of entities. Research and development costs are high. Profit margins are
extremely high on successful SUB-WIDGET designs. Unsuccessful designs result in
significant loss of money, time, and market stature.
State-of-the-art WIDGET-MACHINES change rapidly and each SUB-WIDGET design, if
successful, results in huge revenues to the designer, maker, and seller of the SuBWIDGETS during the particular WIDGET-MACHINES' first three years of life. During the
next three years, the particular SUB-WIDGET design is made in varying degrees of
product imitation by those who target the more general, lower-profit WIDGET-MACHINE
market. During the same period, the market leader's attention is focused on the next
generation of SUB-WIDGET it has introduced into the business and industrial
marketplace. Thereafter, the particular SUB-WIDGET design takes on near commodity
characteristics, as it is sold at a very small profit margin by mass-producers capable of
surviving in the commodity marketplace. Inexpensive WIDGET-MACHINES are supplied
to home-users, until the home-user market no longer desires this now mature SuBWIDGET design.
LEADER is the recognized market leader in designing, making, and selling SuBWIDGETS.
Eighty percent of all WIDGET-MACHINES use LEADER'S SUB-WIDGETS.
Competition is keen and turns on new technological advances and features, product
availability, delivery time, product cost, and manufacturer's reputation. LEADER holds
1066 patents covering various aspects of SUB-WIDGETS. Other makers of SB-WIDGETS
also have extensive patent portfolios for their particular types of SUB-WIDGETS.
NEWCOMER LTD. is a new start-up company. It was formed by a number of people
who previously worked for companies that designed, made, and sold SUB-WIDGETS.
NEWCOMER went into the SUB-WIDGET business because it believes a large amount of
money could be made and that it could contribute to the future of SUB-WIDGET design.
NEWCOMER presently has no issued patents, but has a number of pending patent
applications.
22 For example, the WIDGET-MACHINE might be a personal computer and the SUB-WIDGET the
microprocessor which acts as its brains; or the WIDGET-MACHINE might be a pocket-size portable
telephone and the SUB-WIDGET the display it uses to show alpha-numerics, pictures, and other
information; or the WIDGET-MACHINE might be a product, and the SUB-WIDGET any important
component of that product.
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LEADER has a reputation for guarding and protecting its investment in intellectual
property and using its patent portfolio, if necessary, to stop those who infringe LEADER'S
patent rights. LEADER has spent a huge amount of money on research and development
and needs high profit from successful products to: a) fund the research and development
needed to maintain its lead in the marketplace; b) to keep it at the cutting-edge of SuBWIDGET technology; and c) to continue its significant contributions to the advancement
of SUB-WIDGET science and technology. LEADER has, in the past, licensed some of its
patents to others. LEADER has also entered into cross-license agreements with others
having patents useful to LEADER.
NEWCOMER has a new SuB-WIDGET that it soon expects to be selling to makers of
WIDGET-MACHINES. Mindful of LEADER'S reputation for protecting its patent rights and
the highly-competitive atmosphere in the SUB-WIDGET market, NEWCOMER fears
LEADER will somehow try to interfere with NEWCOMER'S imminent introduction of its
"XIT-I" SUB-WIDGET. Concerned that LEADER might sue NEWCOMER in a less-favorable
forum at an inopportune time, NEWCOMER files a declaratory judgment action in its
home jurisdiction federal district court, seeking a decree of non-infringement of
LEADER'S X patent, Y patent, and Z patent-three of the 1066 patents owned by LEADER.
Prior to the filing of NEWCOMER'S declaratory judgment action, LEADER had not
accused anyone of infringing any of the X, Y, or Z patents, and had not threatened
anyone with suit regarding any of those three patents.

B. Newcomer and Leaderin Competition
For sake of simplicity, we shall assume that NEWCOMER has actually produced, and
is prepared to ship, its new XIT-II SUB-WIDGET in order to satisfy the second prong of
23
the two-prong test, thereby permitting us to focus on the first prong.
Since LEADER has not accused NEWCOMER'S products of infringing any of the three
patents named in NEWCOMER'S declaratory judgment complaint, and LEADER has not
threatened to sue NEWCOMER (or anyone else) for infringing any of those patents, the
objective test for the existence of an actual controversy has but a single line of inquiry:
Has defendant's (LEADER'S) conduct created on the part of the declaratory plaintiff
(NEWCOMER) a reasonable apprehension that NEWCOMER will face an infringement suit
regarding the three patents named in NEWCOMER'S complaint, if NEWCOMER commences
selling its XIT-II SUB-WIDGETS?
In determining the existence of reasonable apprehension, focus should be on
LEADER'S conduct: Did LEADER'S conduct create a reasonable apprehension of suit
regarding the three patents named in NEWCOMER'S complaint?
In our hypothetical, NEWCOMER decided it should file a lawsuit it might otherwise
never actually face, in order to deprive LEADER of a more favorable forum or a more
favorable time for a lawsuit. Trading the mere possibility of suit, for certainty of suit, is
a major business decision, which should not be taken lightly. There might be a large
number of reasons, all unknown to NEWCOMER, that would prevent LEADER from
bringing suit.24 Yet, sometimes, seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement
23 See

discussionsupraSection II.
24 For example, LEADER might believe that the X, Y, and Z patents are weak and might not
survive a rigorous prior art attack because of prior art coming to LEADER's attention after grant of
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might be the most prudent legal and business approach available to NEWCOMER
depending on the company's history or a product's life cycle.
We shall now consider the legal issues and the arguments of the parties.

C. Newcomer's Viewpoint
NEWCOMER has seven main points which will encourage it to file a declaratory
judgment action.
First: NEWCOMER is fearful that LEADER will interfere with NEWCOMER'S
marketing of its XIT-IJ SUB-WIDGETS and intimidate NEWCOMER'S potential customers

into not purchasing from NEWCOMER for fear of patent infringement suits by LEADER.
Such tactics are the type of conduct that the Declaratory Judgment Act was designed to
deal with. Consequently, companies such as NEWCOMER are "no longer restricted to an
in terrorem choice between the incurrence of a growing potential liability for patent
25
infringement and abandonment of their enterprises."
Second-' NEWCOMER has reasonable apprehension based on LEADER'S past conduct
and attitude toward those who would compete with LEADER in the SUB-WIDGET market.
LEADER frequently sues its competitors and new entrants into the SUB-WIDGET market.
Consequently, it is highly probable that LEADER will sue NEWCOMER once NEWCOMER

starts distributing its XIT-JJ SUB-WIDGETS. "[T]he question is whether the relationship
between the parties can be considered a 'controversy' and that inquiry does not turn on
whether the parties have used particular 'magic words' in communicating with one
another." 26 The courts do not require an expressed charge of infringement. When the
patent owner's "conduct, including its statements, falls short of an express charge, one
must consider the 'totality of the circumstances' in determining whether that conduct
meets the first prong of the test .... [A] reasonable apprehension may be found in the
absence of any communication from [LEADER] to [NEWCOMER]. '"27 "[A] patent owner's

willingness and capacity to enforce its patent rights is pertinent to the inquiry for an
28
actual controversy."
Third: Based on NEWCOMER'S knowledge of LEADER'S patent portfolio, the most
likely patents for LEADER to sue on are its X, Y, and Z patents. Those patents appear to
be the most important at this time to NEWCOMER'S manufacture and sale of SUBWIDGETS. NEWCOMER believes it does not infringe any of those three patents, and
therefore seeks a decree stating it does not infringe, so that potential threats of
infringement will not interfere with the sale of its XIT-II SUB-WIDGETS.
Fourth: The SUB-WIDGET market is very capital intensive. NEWCOMER has already

invested a significant portion of its money and manpower into its XIT-I SUB-WIDGET,
the X, Y, and Z patents. Consequently, the patent rights are not worth asserting. Yet if sued, to
protect and maintain a licensing program or to save face in the marketplace, LEADER might be
required to fight back, and possibly fight to NEWCOMER'S financial ruin.
25 Arrowhead,846 F.2d at 735; Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d
1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
26 EMC, 89 F.3d at 812.
27Arrowhead,846 F.2d at 736; see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d
953, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ('[W]e cannot read the Declaratory Judgment Act so narrowly as to require

that a party actually be confronted with an express threat of litigation .. ")(emphasis in original).
28West Interactive Corp. v. First Data Res., Inc., 972 F.2d 1295, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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and will invest a lot more into marketing and distributing those SUB-WIDGETS. Were
LEADER to sue NEWCOMER, or NEWCOMER'S customers, for infringement after
NEWCOMER begins marketing and distributing its XIT-II SUB-WIDGETS, the results
would be financially devastating for NEWCOMER. Therefore, NEWCOMER needs a decree
of non-infringement, and preferably an injunction prohibiting LEADER from intimating
NEWCOMER or NEWCOMER'S customers, to prevent financial loss to NEWCOMER caused by
probable future action by LEADER.
Fifth. Even if LEADER were unsuccessful in a patent infringement suit against
NEWCOMER or NEWCOMER'S customers, publicity attendant to such a lawsuit would hurt
marketing and distribution of NEWCOMER'S new XIT-JJ SUB-WIDGET, thereby making
NEWCOMER'S new product offering a failure. The probability of imminent litigation by
LEADER, directed against either NEWCOMER or NEWCOMER'S customers, likely will hurt
NEWCOMER'S product offering.
Sixth. NEWCOMER is a struggling-to-survive business that cannot weather a poor
new-product introduction. NEWCOMER does not have the financial resources of LEADER,
and cannot engage in prolonged and costly litigation. Also, NEWCOMER'S business
cannot survive the likelihood of litigation hanging over its head like a Damoclean sword.
Seventh; The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to provide parties, such
as NEWCOMER, a way of determining their legal rights, without incurring growing
potential liability for patent infringement to, or being driven to extreme expense by,
29
large established companies such as LEADER.

D. Leader's Viewpoint
LEADER has five main points, which from LEADER'S point of view, make it
inappropriate for NEWCOMER to file a declaratory judgment action.
First: LEADER owns 1066 patents related to SUB-WIDGETS. Three of those
patents-less than one-third of one percent of LEADER'S patent portfolio-are involved in
NEWCOMER'S declaratory judgment action. LEADER has not accused NEWCOMER of
infringing the three patents named in NEWCOMER'S complaint, or threatened suit for
such infringement. Similarly, LEADER has not threatened suit, or accused NEWCOMER of
infringing the other 1063 patents owned by LEADER. NEWCOMER should not be
permitted to seek a declaratory judgment of another 20 or 100 or 500 of those patents,
thereby, forcing LEADER to prove infringement of, or to grant NEWCOMER patent
clearance under, each of those 20 or 100 or 500 patents. "The 'reasonable apprehension
of suit' test should require more than the nervous state of mind of a possible infringer. .
.30
" Moreover, because LEADER "has done nothing but obtain a patent, there can be no
basis for the required apprehension, a rule that protects quiescent patent owners
31
against unwarranted litigation."
Second. The fact that LEADER has a history of protecting its patent rights should
not be dispositive. Even if LEADER has been a litigious plaintiff, its record in past suits
does not by itself show that it has charged infringement of the patents challenged in this
suit. At most, a past record of infringement suits shows that LEADER might precipitate
29 Arrowhead,846

F.2d at 734-35.
'30 Phillips Plastics v. Kato Hatsujou K.K., 57 F.3d 1051, 1053-54 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
'31Arrowhead,846 F.2d at 736.

[3:001 2003]

Using Declaratory Judgments Offensively in Patent Cases

an actual controversy sometime in the future, not that it has done so already. Those
other lawsuits indicate that under certain circumstances, LEADER will pursue patent
infringement litigation to defend against infringement of its patents. They do not
indicate that LEADER would pursue a patent suit with respect to NEWCOMER'S XIT-JI
SUB-WIDGETS, or that LEADER has formed any opinion as to whether NEWCOMER'S XITII SUB-WIDGETS infringe any of the three patents named in NEWCOMER'S complaint.
The other lawsuits cannot be viewed as anything more than a general indication that
LEADER considers litigation a viable alternative once it has determined that a competitor
is infringing a LEADER patent. Moreover, "federal patent law bars the imposition of
liability for publicizing a patent in the marketplace unless [NEWCOMER] can show
32
[LEADER] acted in bad faith."
Third: The fact that LEADER owns numerous patents does not alone create a right
to challenge one or more of those patents in court. Absent an actual controversy, such a
challenge is an abuse of the judicial process, and a determination of non-infringement is
merely an advisory opinion. 33 [Jit is the objective words and actions of the patentee
that are controlling. Although such words and actions are not viewed in isolation of
their intended effect on the listener, a subjective apprehension is insufficient without
34
objective substance."
Fourth: The focus should not be on other patents owned by LEADER or other
lawsuits involving other patents, but rather on the three of LEADER'S 1066 patents
named in NEWCOMER'S complaint.
Those are the only three patents for which
declaratory relief is sought, and subject matter jurisdiction, if it exists at all, must exist
regarding those three patents.
Fifth: NEWCOMER heavily relies on general statements, comments, and conduct by
LEADER about competitors in general, and about the SUB-WIDGET market. NEWCOMER
extrapolates those general statements and conducts and applies them to itself and its
new product. Such extrapolations cannot form the basis of "reasonable" apprehension.
These extrapolations do not involve conduct by LEADER, directed to NEWCOMER,
regardingany of the three patents involved in this lawsuit or regardingthe NEWCOMER
product involved in this lawsuit; nor do they involve patents involved in the lawsuit, or
the NEWCOMER productinvolved in the lawsuit.
The apprehension NEWCOMER professes regarding the three patents named in its
complaint might be real, but it is not reasonable. At most, NEWCOMER'S apprehension is
a purely subjective, which, by law, is insufficient to satisfy the actual controversy
35
requirement.

32 Hunter

Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

33Int'l Med. Prosthetics Research Assocs., Inc. v. Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc., 787 F.2d 572, 576

(Fed. Cir. 1986).
34BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
')Indium Corp. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 883 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Gore Enter. Holdings,
787 F.2d at 575.
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E. MeritoriousPositionson Each Side
With what appear to be meritorious positions on each side, should NEWCOMER'S
corporate counsel authorize filing a Declaratory Judgment Action? Once such a lawsuit
is filed, what will a district court judge likely do?
Before we consider these questions, we shall consider some practicalities of
declaratory judgment actions involving patents, and how those actions differ from
similar actions not involving patents.

IV.

PATENT DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS ARE DIFFERENT

An action seeking a declaration of non-infringement of a United States patent is
significantly different from other declaratory judgment actions. In a declaratory
judgment action seeking a declaration of rights under a contract, for example, the
burden of proof is on the declaratory judgment plaintiff to prove that the contract should
be construed in the manner urged by the plaintiff. As expected, the proponent of the
action-the plaintiff-bears the burden of proof in respect to the merits of the
construction issues contended in the plaintiffs pleadings.
In a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of non-infringement of a
patent, the burden is not on the declaratory judgment plaintiff to prove noninfringement. Instead, the burden is on the declaratory judgment defendant-the
patentee-to prove infringement.36 Things are backwards, with the proponent of the
action-the plaintiff-not bearing the burden of proof in respect to the merits of the noninfringement issues contented in the plaintiffs pleadings.
Thus, unlike the typical declaratory judgment action where the declaratory
judgment plaintiff shoulders the burden of proof, in the patent situation the declaratory
judgment plaintiff-NEWCOMER-effectively
forces the declaratory judgment
defendant-LEADER-to shoulder the burden of proof and its attendant costs.
NEWCOMER filing suit forces LEADER to prove infringement or suffer an adverse
judgment.
In the contract-based declaratory judgment action example above, the relief sought
by the declaratory judgment plaintiff has a clear nexus or causal connection to the
conduct giving rise to the apprehension of suit: A contractual relationship exists
between the two parties, the parties having previously entered into a contract requiring
mutual performance.
The same is not true in the patent-based declaratory judgment action between
NEWCOMER and LEADER. Obtaining a patent creates no relationship between the
patentee and the declaratory judgment plaintiff; the Federal Circuit has repeatedly

36 Under Sea Indus., Inc. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The burden
always is on the patentee to show infringement."); Advance Transformer Co. v. Levinson, 837 F.2d
1081, 1084-85 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See Advance Transformer Co. v. Levinson, 231 U.S.P.Q. 1, 18 (N.D.
Ill. 1986) ("The burden of proof rests upon the patent owner to prove infringement .... Even in a
declaratory judgment action where plaintiff pleads non-infringement, the patentee-defendant still
has the burden to prove infringement.").
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held that obtaining a patent is not sufficient to create declaratory judgment
3
jurisdiction. '
In a patent-based declaratory judgment action, the logical nexus between the
plaintiff and the patent-holding defendant should be the defendant's patent-based
threats or accusations against the plaintiff. Then, in the declaratory judgment action,
the defendant must merely put forth evidence to show infringement - a situation more
manageable than forcing the plaintiff to prove a negative, namely, that no conceivable
activity by the accused could infringe the defendant's patent rights. Logically, then, if
there were no patent-based threats or accusations by the defendant against the plaintiff,
no objectively reasonable apprehension of suit could exist, and, thus, the first prong of
the Federal Circuit's objective test would not be met. As a necessary consequence,
declaratory judgment jurisdiction would not exist.
This logic, however, gets turned on its head under the Federal Circuit's totality of
the circumstances approach. Using that approach, reasonable apprehension may be
found to exist although no patent-based threats exist. Accordingly, this favors
NEWCOMER and is detrimental to LEADER.

V. OPENING THE FLOOD-GATES OF LITIGATION OR DEALING WITH
MARKETPLACE REALITIES?

Do district court orders based on the Federal Circuit's totality of the circumstances
open the floodgates of litigation? Or do they deal with the realities of tactics in the
marketplace? Such orders essentially hold that general apprehension is sufficient for
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, and apprehension need not be traced to the patent
sued on.
If there need not be a nexus between the patent sued on and the patent holder's
conduct allegedly giving rise to the apprehension of suit-even in situations where the
plaintiff has a secret product known only to the plaintiff-is there anything to stop a
new, fledgling company who wants to market its secret new product from filing a
declaratory judgment action against whomever it expects to be its primary competitor in
the marketplace, thereby forcing that target either to grant a license or to undertake the
cost of proving infringement regarding some secret product the target (and indeed the
world) knows nothing about, and about which the target might have formed no opinions,
has no information, and has taken no action? On the other side, should intentionally
forming no such opinion about a competitor's product be a permitted escape route from
litigation for a patentee who creates a general apprehension of suit in the marketplace?
Do such orders expose all established companies owning patents to numerous
lawsuits instituted by potential competitors, regarding any patent in the established
company's portfolio, whether or not that patent has been involved in litigation or has
been asserted against anyone? Or do they only expose to suit those patent owners who
37 BP Chems., 4 F.3d at 978; Go-re Enter. Holdings, 787 F.2d at 576; Phillips Plastics v. Kato
Hatsujou K.K., 57 F.3d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (offering a license under a patent does not create
jurisdiction); Cygnus Therapeutic Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1160-61 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(refusing to offer a license under a patent does not create jurisdiction); Fina Research, S.A. v. Baroid
Ltd., 141 F.3d 1479, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Apprehension of suit sufficient for declaratory judgment
jurisdiction cannot arise from a contractual relationship alone, such as that between a patent owner
licensor and its licensee; instead, it must arise from the actions of the patent owner. Id.
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go beyond some "line in the sand" drawn by the sword of justice? If the latter, how does
the court or the patent owner determine where that line lies? The drastic business and
financial consequences are readily apparent: In such instances, the burden of proof, and
its attendant cost, is on the established company-the declaratory judgment
defendant-to prove infringement, rather than on the entity bringing the suit and
requesting the relief.
The Federal Circuit's totality of the circumstances approach, as applied to patentinvalidating on-sale activities under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b),38 was struck-down by the
Supreme Court in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. 39 Thereafter, in Brasseler USA v.
Stryker Sales Corp., the Federal Circuit said its totality of the circumstancesapproach
led to unpredictable results when used to determine whether a sale or an offer for sale
has occurred. 40 Are the results any more predictable when the same approach isused to
determine whether the defendant's conduct created on the part of the declaratory
plaintiff a reasonable apprehension of suit?
From a practical point of view, it is impossible to treat the Declaratory Judgment
Act as guarding against, and "reasonable apprehension of suit" encompassing, only a
laundry list of specific types of conduct by a patentee. A rule stating that apprehension
of suit exists only when one of a dozen types of conduct occurs, merely challenges the
clever would-be declaratory judgment plaintiff to come up with a thirteenth. Hence, the
Federal Circuit's totality of the circumstances approach. But does this approach
inherently result in unpredictability, as admitted by one Federal Circuit panel in
41
Brasseler?
The long line of Federal Circuit cases applying the totality of the circumstances
approach to determine whether an actual controversy exists, are all based on the
Federal Circuit's interpretation of the Supreme Court's rather short opinion in the 1941
Maryland Casualty v. Pacifie Coal & Gas Co.42 insurance contract case-an
interpretation not yet tested in the Supreme Court. Would the Federal Circuit's
interpretation and approach survive Supreme Court scrutiny? Or would they be struckdown as was an identical approach in PafL?
Obviously, not permitting any statements by the patent holder regarding the
patent holder's patent and a competitor's product would be a speech restriction
unparalleled in First Amendment law. 43 But where is the line to be drawn? And in
drawing it, how are the rights of the patent holder balanced against those of the
declaratory judgment plaintiff so as to achieve the constitutional purpose behind
44
encouraging patents, namely, "To promote the Progress of... useful Arts"?

'3 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ...the invention
was ... on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for a patent
in the United States... ").
'39525 U.S. 55 (1998).
40 182 F.3d 888, 890 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
41 Albeit in respect to a different statutory provision, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) rather than 28 U.S.C. §
2201. 182 F.3d 888, 890 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
42312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); see cases cited supranote 21 and accompanying text.
43City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 421 (1993) ("[S]peech that does
no more than propose a commercial transaction is protected by the First Amendment.").
44U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "The Congress shall have Power... to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
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Were the Federal Circuit's totality of the circumstancesapproach being challenged,
these would be important policy considerations for the Supreme Court, and fertile
ground for Supreme Court action. Until such a challenge, however, the district courts
are to use the Federal Circuit's totality of the circumstances approach in determining
whether an actual controversy exists-an approach favoring the non-patent holder
seeking patent clearance. Here that approach favors NEWCOMER and places LEADER in
the position of having to prove infringement or grant patent clearance.

VI. USING DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS OFFENSIVELY

In our hypothetical fact situation, NEWCOMER can effectively use a declaratory
judgment action to obtain patent clearance from LEADER or to otherwise leverage the
marketplace situation, intentionally or inadvertently created by LEADER, to
NEWCOMER'S advantage. Viewing litigation as a tool for achieving business objectives,
NEWCOMER might sue LEADER to protect its new product offering, to protect its
reputation or image, to protect its customers, to send a message to the industry, to
expand its business opportunities by establishing a joint venture or a strategic alliance
as part of a settlement, or to distract or confuse LEADER-provided, of course,
NEWCOMER'S lawsuit is meritorious and complies with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
45
Civil Procedure.
Filing a lawsuit and showing the district court that an actual controversy exists
under the totality of the circumstances, however, might not be enough, because the
district court has much discretion, not only in close situations like the one between
LEADER and NEWCOMER, but in all declaratory judgment situations: Even if declaratory
46
judgment jurisdiction exists, the district court can decline to exercise that jurisdiction.
, Rule 11 provides, in pertinent part:
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least
one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not
represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party ....
An unsigned paper
shall be stricken ....
(b) . . . By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) the allegations and
other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery;
and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are
warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on
a lack of information or belief. (c) . . . If ... the court determines that subdivision
(b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below,
impose an appropriate sanction ....
(d) . . . Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule
do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a).
46 EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Cygnus Therapeutic Sys. v.
ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
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The Declaratory Judgment Act states that a court may grant declaratory relief, not that
it must; there is no absolute right to a declaratory judgment. And although "the district
court's discretion is not unfettered, . . . as long as the district court acts in accordance
with the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the principles of sound judicial
administration, the court has broad discretion to refuse to entertain a declaratory
47
judgment action," a discretion usually respected by the Federal Circuit.

Therefore, beyond showing an actual controversy exists under the totality of the
circumstances, NEWCOMER should show the district court that LEADER infected the

competitive environment with uncertainty and insecurity. NEWCOMER'S evidence should
make it difficult for the court to imagine how a prudent NEWCOMER executive,
confronted with the totality of LEADER'S conduct, could resist the onset of an
apprehension that NEWCOMER would be sued. NEWCOMER'S evidence should show the

court that, considering the realities of business life, such an executive could incur the
wrath of shareholders if he or she either offered NEWCOMER'S product without seeking a
resolution of the conflict of interests or abandoned the product. And, NEWCOMER must
convince the court that court intervention is needed to clear the air, to resolve the
conflict, and to restore lawful competition.
Because most district court orders and decisions are not reported, the success or
failure of declaratory judgment plaintiffs in convincing district courts that an actual
controversy exists sufficient to support declaratory judgment jurisdiction, and that the
equities favor the district court exercising jurisdiction, go largely unreported. Indeed,
once the trial court decides that it will or will not exercise declaratory judgment
jurisdiction, many adverse parties reach a mutually acceptable business solution to the
dispute rather than engage in the uncertainties and costs of prolonged patent litigation.
In this sense, declaratory judgment actions achieve many of the business objectives
mentioned above, using the federal court system-albeit not through the complete trial
and appeal process-to resolve business disputes. Care must be taken, however, so that
the district court understands that the lawsuit is one, which furthers the objectives of
the Declaratory Judgment Act, and is not merely a tactical measure filed to improve the
48
declaratory judgment plaintiffs perceived position in the marketplace.
The declaratory judgment plaintiffs evidence needs to paint a picture of the clanse
macabre so vividly described by Chief Judge Markey in Arrowhead Industrial Water,
Inc. v. Eeoloehem, Inc., 49 in which the declaratory judgment plaintiff is forced into an in
47 EMC, 89 F.3d at 813-14; Serco Services Co. v. Kelley Co., 51 F.3d 1037, 1039 (Fed. Cir.
1995); Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1 See EMC, 89 F.3d at 815 (finding that the declaratory judgment action brought as a tactical
measure to improve plaintiffs negotiating position and jurisdiction was denied); BP Chems. Ltd. v.
Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that the declaratory judgment action
brought as a marketing strategy and denying jurisdiction).
49 846 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988):
This appeal presents a type of the sad and saddening scenario that led to
enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act ....
In the patent version of that
scenario, a patent owner engages in a danse macabre, brandishing a Damoclean

threat with a sheathed sword ....

Guerrilla-like, the patent owner attempts

extra-judicial patent enforcement with scare-the-customer-and-run tactics that
infect the competitive environment of the business community with uncertainty

and insecurity ....
Before the Act, competitors victimized by that tactic were
rendered helpless and immobile so long as the patent owner refused to grasp the
nettle and sue. After the Act, those competitors were no longer restricted to an in
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terrorem choice between incurring a growing potential liability for patent infringement,
and abandoning its enterprises.
The declaratory judgment defendant, on the other hand, needs to show that the
plaintiffs apprehension is objectively unreasonable 50 or that the court should not
51
exercise jurisdiction due to the equities or the practicalities of the situation.
Study of reported declaratory judgment cases reveals heavy emphasis on the
evidence before the district court, and the equities shown by that evidence. When the
evidence primarily tends to show the declaratory judgment defendant caused
apprehension in the marketplace, even when that apprehension is not tied to a
particular patent or product, courts tend to find and exercise declaratory judgment
jurisdiction. 52 But when the evidence primarily tends to show the declaratory judgment
terrorem choice between incurrence of a growing potential liability for patent
infringement and abandonment of their enterprises; they could clear the air by
suing for a judgment that would settle the conflict of interests.
The sole
requirement for jurisdiction under the Act is that the conflict be real and
immediate, i.e., that there be a true, actual 'controversy' required by the Act.
Id. at 734-35.
50 See Cygnus 92 F.3d 1153; Shell Oil, 970 F.2d 885.
5l See EMC89 F.3d 807; BP Chems., 4 F.3d 975.
52 See Green Keepers, Inc. v. Softspikes, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7728 (E.D. Pa. May 19,
1999).
Softspikes also argues that Green Keepers may not proceed because no
alleged threat of suit ever identified the specific patent or patent claims that
Green Keepers' products infringe, nor did they specify that suit would be filed
with respect to Softspikes' U.S. patents, rather than its Canadian patents.
Softspikes has cited no case requiring a patentee to disclose this type of detail
before an alleged infringer may bring a declaratory judgment action. If specifics
of this nature were a prerequisite, a patentee could disrupt a putative infringer's
business for years simply by threatening suit in general terms. The alleged
infringer would remain powerless to initiate a declaratory judgment action to
resolve the dispute. We do not believe the law forces a party into such an
untenable predicament.

Id. at *8.
The threat of infringement does not have to be directed against plaintiffs
specifically. It is sufficient to create a reasonable apprehension if plaintiffs'
customers, or other competitors, are threatened ....
[R]easonable apprehension
exists when there is an implied charge or set of circumstances which would cause
a reasonable man to fear that he or his customers may be sued for patent
infringement.... The accusation of infringement need not be made directly to the
declaratory judgment plaintiff, but may be made to its customers or the industry
at large.
Sigma-Tau Industrie Farmaceutiche Riunite, S.p.A. v. Lonza, Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 n.5 (D.D.C.
1999).
Often, however ....
the claims of infringement are made more generally or more
indirectly or both ....
[W]here the defendant has publicly made claims for his
patent which encompass plaintiffs similar product (or process) and which were
made against a sufficiently threatening background, the plaintiff may treat such
claims as a general charge of infringement against the kind of product embraced
by those claims and sue for declaratory judgment ....
Indeed, [the defendant]
need not even have known about plaintiffs activity before the action was
commenced.
Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 237-38 (D.N.J. 1966); see also id. at 238
n.38 (stating that reasonable apprehension of suit can exist even when the patentee has made no
express charge of infringement to anyone, but had stated claims for it sufficiently broad to
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plaintiff is attempting to use the Declaratory Judgment Act to gain a negotiating or
53
marketing advantage, the courts tend to either not find or not exercise jurisdiction.
When the court has jurisdiction and is convinced it should exercise that jurisdiction,
the declaratory judgment defendant has the power to divest the court of jurisdiction.
Because a reasonable apprehension of suit must exist not only at the time the action is
filed, but at all stages of review, the declaratory judgment defendant can divest the court
of jurisdiction by promising not to sue the declaratory judgment plaintiff for infringing
the particular patent. As stated by the Federal Circuit, "[w]e have held that a covenant
not to sue for any infringing acts involving products 'made, sold, or used' on or before the
filing date is sufficient to divest a trial court of jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment
action."

54

If the declaratory judgment defendant refuses to make a covenant not to sue, or
imposes limitations upon a covenant, those actions may be considered by the district
court and used by the declaratory judgment plaintiff to convince the court to exercise
55
jurisdiction and entertain the declaratory judgment action.

VII. CONCLUSION
Is not a covenant not to be sued, or an acceptable business deal, all NEWCOMER
needs from LEADER, in order for NEWCOMER to go about its new product offering without
fear of NEWCOMER, or its customers, being sued?
By using a declaratory judgment action offensively, NEWCOMER achieves its
business objectives and gets the freedom it needs to conduct its business in an orderly,
predictable fashion. LEADER is not the victim of a legal system gone astray, but rather
controls its own destiny, because it has the power to use its leadership position to ensure
that neither LEADER, nor those purportedly acting on its behalf, create marketplace
encompass the competitor's product by implication); aecordArrowhoad,846 F.2d at 735 (discussing
the Federal Circuit's acknowledgement of the analysis conducted in Japan Gas Lighter,257 F.
Supp. at 237-38); Oc6-Office Sys., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 805 F. Supp. 642, 645-46 (N.D. Ill.
1992).
53 Reported trial court rationale on point include: Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. CIBA Corp., 39 F.
Supp. 2d 271, 275 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (discounting much of the same type of conduct other courts have
found persuasive, and concluding that plaintiffs declaratory judgment action "was designed in part
as a weapon to strengthen [declaratory judgment plaintiffs] hand in any negotiations" with
defendant, and that allowing a declaratory judgment action to proceed under such circumstances
would discourage good-faith efforts to negotiate); Lyon Indus. Inc. v. Am. Standards Inc., 993 F.
Supp. 609, 612-14 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (finding that the declaratory judgment action was brought to
gain a procedural advantage). BP Chems., 4 F.3d at 980 (finding that the declaratory judgment
action was brought as a marketing strategy). In each, the trial court declined jurisdiction.
' Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 855 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Preiser
v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d
1054, 1058-60 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Spectronics Corp. v. Harry B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631, 633-38 (Fed.
Cir. 1991); Intellectual Property v. TCI Cablevision, 248 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 216 (2001). For a similar discussion by district courts, see, for example, SL Waber,Inc. v.
Am. Power Conversion Corp., 50 U.S.Q.P.2d 1355 (D.N.J. 1999), GFI Inc. v. FranklinIndus., 55 F.
Supp. 2d 565 (W.D.Miss. 1999), and Green Keepers, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7728 (E.D. Pa. May
19, 1999).
Amana, 172 F.3d at 855; SuperSaek, 57 F.3d at 1056, 1059-60; Spectronies, 940 F.2d at
636-38; Green Keepers, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7728 at *13- 14.
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apprehension. NEWCOMER simply has a remedy to use when the marketplace becomes
infected with uncertainty and insecurity.
This remedy is powerful. Therefore it needs to be used cautiously and skillfully,
with a clear focus on the business objectives to be achieved by the declaratory judgment
action, and thorough consideration of how much capital, in terms of people and money, a
company is prepared to spend in fighting, and the cost to the company if it does not fight,
or fights and loses. Starting a lawsuit NEWCOMER might otherwise never actually face,
is a major business decision not to be taken lightly. 56 Sometimes, however, bringing a
declaratory judgment action of non-infringement is the most prudent and effective way
for the company to clear the air, resolve conflict, and restore lawful competition.

DJ JwE--TAKE Two
A danse macabre,
you have begun;
Damoclean threat,
a sheathed one;
Scare-the -customer,
and then run,
Guerrilla-like,
that's what you've done.
'No apprehensionofsuit,"
'No reasonableone',
These things you say,
once my DJ's begun;
You tell the court,
you've done no more,
Than what you may,
under patent law.
That might be so,
but you must expect,
Your actions, to others,
have in terrorem effect,
Infecting competition,
with uncertainty and fear,
Court help is needed,
to clear the air.
To help the market,
keep competition free,
The Federal Circuit,
created totalty.
Viewing all,
5 See supra,note 24 and accompanying text.
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that's come to pass,
Before the court,
we are at last.
Escape my DJ, have you a chance,
Under "totalityofeireumstance"?

